Example Of Article Review On Cooperative Game Theory

The cooperative game theory as described in an article by Harald Wiese speaks to it being a power struggle between two players. It can work one of two ways. In one way, a player may force another to do something against their will. In another, one may benefit from something more than the other.
In terms of economics, cooperative game theory provides opportunities available to a group or coalition. The coalition determines a value or worth of something. Depending on whether the situation is social, political or economic, will determine the values that a coalition can acquire (Wiese). The worth or value of a coalition is termed a coalition function. This function cannot always be determined. Cooperative game theory comes into play by providing a resulting outcome related to the coalition function. (Wiese). In theory, the application of a solution is a means by which to estimate the rewards that are expected to be achieved (Wiese).
Cooperative game theory tends to be a much more rigorous and detailed approach in how it is perceived. As Wiese describes, “a coalition function comes with a story describing the relationship between people.” Although cooperative game theory is primarily about rewards, they are not received without some form of recommended actions needed to make it happen.
The core premise of Wiese’s article is determining how actions between two people happens in relation to cooperative game theory. Wiese’s claim is that power is the basis for how “one actor within a social relationship will obtain costly benefits from others” in how it relates to a power-over outcome. His focus hones in on how power is omnipresent and the idea that in any relationship that involves an exchange both parties are influenced by the other and will make decisions based upon that.
An example of this is if Company A offers to pay Company B for a product or service and Company B accepts the offer, Wiese poses the question if this demonstrates Company A’s power over Company B? Or, in another sense, is it possible for Company B to have power over Company A because it provided the product or service Company A offered to pay for? It can be perceived that Company B being the coalition, decided what the coalition function should be for Company A. As a result, Company A determines if this coalition function is just reward for their offer. Wiese describes this exchange as Company A being the entity that holds the power over Company B if it is able to acquire the product or service by being undermining. On the other hand, Company B has power over Company A if its asking price is too high and Company A is in critical need of the product or service being offered.
Wiese’s research into this ideology refutes the notion that one party over another does not necessarily stand firm in the fact that without one the other would cease to exist. He theorizes that this theory can potentially impact both parties in a relationship equally. Wiese examines this theory in several examples throughout the article. The rewards of one party having power over another was explored. Using player 1 and player 2, Wiese surmised that if player 1 gains power over player 2, two separate coalition functions have to be considered. One coalition function would be the situation, be is political, social, or economic that player 1 interjects power over player 2. In turn, if player 2 refuses player 1’s power then neither party would have power over the other. They would remain equal (Wiese).
Wiese also studied how emotions play into cooperative game theory. Here he examines the relationship between a man and woman living together. He theorized that they may equally enjoy living together but the man may be less dependent on the woman than the woman is on the man. Therefore, he concludes the man receives the higher reward in this situation (Wiese).
The results of Wiese’s research concludes that power-over relationships exist in every relationship regardless of political, social, or economic situation. There is an inherent threat that exists between two parties in a relationship. This threat is that of withdrawal. As a result, rewards for both parties are equalized to minimize the threat of withdrawal.
In conclusion, Wiese’s article leaves many unanswered questions with regard to how power is clearly linked to rewards and how they are obtained. Is it achieved from enacting a particular behavior or action in order to bring it about? Is it connected to the lengths one will go to in order to come out on top? Wiese’s finding are inconclusive at best. His claim is that power over another needs a basis from which it is derived. There is no verifiable omnipresent selection of that basis. Wiese’s article seemed to take the reader in a circle; not really proving his point, and inflating the data to make his points seem valid with no real conclusions as an end result.

Work Cited

Wiese, Harald. "Applying Cooperative Game Theory to Power Relations." Quality and quantity 43.4 (2009): 519-33. ProQuest.Web. 10 Mar. 2015.