Actions Against / For Nuclear Proliferation Essay Examples

Against a global arms race and a bipolar conflict, actions against / for nuclear (non)proliferation continue to show differential responses in a world of less defined international politics and decaying certainty. Indeed, nuclear (non)proliferation, both as a strategy and practice, has come to be defined largely according to few major events in world conflicts, particularly bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and US-USSR global conflict during Cold War. The case for nuclear non(proliferation) is witnessing, meanwhile, a set of fresh reviews in a post-Cold War era: from a Cold War era in which nuclear (non)proliferation strategy and action has been defined largely by a global conflict in a bipolar world 1 into a post-Cold War one in which non-state actors emerge as significant global players in setting (non)proliferation agenda 2,3, nuclear (non)proliferation is under increasing international scrutiny.
In order to assess how nuclear (non)proliferation is complicated, particularly in a post-Cold War world, a closer look into current international politics scene should be performed. This should uncover, at least initially, scope and depth of nuclear (non)proliferation complexity.
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1. Tanya Ogilvie-White."Is there a theory of nuclear proliferation? An analysis of the contemporary debate," abstract, The Nonproliferation Review 4 (1996): 43-60, accessed February 1, 2015, doi: 10.1080/10736709608436652, http://www.tandfonline.com/.
2. Sonali Singh and Christopher R. Way. "The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation: A Quantitative Test," abstract, Journal of Conflict Resolution 48 (2004): 859-885, accessed February 1, 2015, doi: 10.1177/0022002704269655, http://online.sagepub.com/.
3. T. Greenwood, H.A. Feiveson, and T.B. Taylor, "Nuclear Proliferation: Motivations, Capabilities, and Strategies for Control," synopsis of Nuclear Proliferation: Motivations, Capabilities, and Strategies for Control (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1977), accessed February 1, 2015, doi: 7286490, http://www.osti.gov/scitech/.
Early during US-USSR global competition over world politics and influence, one major framework of nuclear (non)proliferation began to emerge as a dominant approach, i.e. nuclear non-proliferation as a strategy for nuclear weaponization containment. The basic assumption for non-proliferation has been based on a possibility of a nuclear war outbreak. 4, 5 The very foundation of a nuclear non-proliferation strategy during Cold War has been, hence, one informed by risk, fear and war on a state platform. As Cold War concluded, however, a state nuclear weapon has been regarded as one of deterrence as opposed to being one of actual use. 6
Indeed, in light of increasing outside national security destabilizers, asymmetric nuclear capability 7as well as reaction to US increasing influence and hegemony 8, more states have come to adopt a nuclear weaponization approach,
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4. Michael D. Intriligator and Dagobert L. Brito. "Nuclear proliferation and the probability of nuclear war," abstract, Public Choice 37 (1981): 247-260, accessed February 1, 2015, doi: 10.1007/BF00138245, http://link.springer.com/.
5. Dagobert L. Brito and Michael D. Intriligator. "Chapter 6 Arms races and proliferation," abstract, Handbook of Defense Economics 1 (1995):  109–164, accessed February 1, 2015, doi: 10.1016/S1574-0013(05)80008-0, http://www.sciencedirect.com/.
6. Erik Gartzke and Dong-Joon Jo. "Bargaining, Nuclear Proliferation, and Interstate Disputes," abstract, Journal of Conflict Resolution 53 (2009): 209-233, accessed February 1, 2015, doi: 10.1177/0022002708330289, http://online.sagepub.com/.
particularly ones being referred to as pariah states 9 whose insecurity concerns far surpass guaranteed outside support. Increasingly, nuclear weaponization has come to be a state bargaining power, rather than a weapon intended for actual use in interstate conflicts. 10
The growing asymmetric nuclear capabilities, moreover, is a relatively novel factor in nuclear weaponization. Due to an increasing number of nuclear club members, nuclear weaponization is sought by more states in order to balance out power differences. Indeed, according to a pro-proliferation view, probabilities of bilateral nuclear conflicts decrease when more states assume more nuclear weaponization capabilities – again a view compatible to an idealist, demand approach. Ironically, however, given utility of such an approach, nuclear proliferation becomes a doctrine which runs against existing international law of NPT, a contradiction which requires deeper review on bilateral and multilateral platforms. Admittedly, instead of incentivizing or punishing non-signatories according to international law, new frameworks of nuclear weaponization need to be crafted and
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7. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William H. Riker. "An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Nuclear Proliferation," abstract, Journal of Conflict Resolution 26 (1982): 283-306, accessed February 1, 2015, doi:10.1177/0022002782026002005, http://online.sagepub.com/.
8. Kurt M. Campbell. "Nuclear proliferation beyond rogues," abstract, The Washington Quarterly 26 (2002): 5-15, accessed February 1, 2015, doi: 10.1162/016366003761036453, http://www.tandfonline.com/
9. Robert E. Harkavy. "Pariah states and nuclear proliferation," abstract, International Organization 35 (1981): 135-163, accessed February 1, 2015, doi: 10.1017/S0020818300004112, http://journals.cambridge.org/
10. Erik Gartzke and Dong-Joon Jo. "Bargaining, Nuclear Proliferation, and Interstate Disputes."
adopted in light of new global nuclear order.
As more states joined nuclear club, interstate relations, particularly between US and rising South-Eastern economies such as India, became more sour. 11
Terrorism, non-state actors and growing threats from "rouge states" are no less prominent new comers in a post-Cold War world. By broadening nuclear risk from well-identified nuclear club members, aggravation of Iran and South Korea's nuclear crises seem to spark a nuclear arms race in hot conflict areas such as Middle East and Northeast Asia. 12 As well, by spreading risk from a state platform to sub-state or non-state platforms, nuclear non-proliferation framework has been subject to further scrutiny in a new global nuclear order. 13
Thus, as a result of increasing number of players, shifting alliances and growing power imbalances, an analysis conflict has arisen between an optimistic, proliferation approach and a pessimistic, non-proliferation one. 14 The strategy for
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11. Deepa Ollapally and Raja Ramanna. "U.S.-India Tensions: Misperceptions on Nuclear Proliferation," excerpt, Foreign Affairs 13 (1995), accessed February 1, 2015, http://www.heinonline.org/HOL/CSV.csv?index=journals&collection=journals, https://home.heinonline.org/.
12. Peter R. Lavoy. "Nuclear Proliferation over the Next Decade: Causes, Warning Signs, and Policy Responses," abstract, The Nonproliferation Review 13 (2006): 433-454, accessed February 1, 2015, doi: 10.1080/10736700601071363, http://www.tandfonline.com/.
13. Steven E. Miller and Scott D. Sagan. "Nuclear power without nuclear proliferation?" abstract, Daedalus 138 (2009): 7-18, accessed February 1, 2015, doi: 10.1162/daed.2009.138.4.7, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/.
14. Barry R. Schneider. "Nuclear Proliferation and Counter-Proliferation: Policy Issues and Debates," abstract, Mershon International Studies Review 38 (1994): 209-234, accessed February 1, 2015, http://www.jstor.org/stable/222715.
nuclear weaponization has shifted now from sheer non-proliferation into nuclear proliferation management. 15 The roadmap for nuclear non-proliferation has, indeed, become far more complex –requiring a re-examination of adopted strategies, particularly when proliferation becomes a state of affairs, not a potential event. 16 This paper aims, hence, to explore nuclear non(proliferation) approaches in a multipolar nuclear world.
Initially, action against / for nuclear weaponization has adopted an extreme approach of non-proliferation. This approach has been characterized by realist, supply-side, control measures. 17 During a heightened period of bipolar rivalry, emphasis was laid on a non-proliferation regime for smaller, potential players and containment for bigger ones. Further, implications for a non-proliferation seemed, according to a Cold War perspective, to induce a pattern addressing high-risk category states and rapid proliferation rate. 18 As Cold War deepened, reaching an apex during Cuban missile crisis 19, nuclear weaponization began to show great ____________________
15. Peter D. Feaver and Emerson M. S. Niou. "Managing Nuclear Proliferation: Condemn, Strike, or Assist?" abstract, International Studies Quarterly 40 (1996): 209-233, accessed February 1, 2015, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600957.
16. Stephen Peter Rosen. "After Proliferation: What to Do If More States Go Nuclear," abstract, Foreign Affairs 85 (2006): 9-14, accessed February 1, 2015, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20032066.
17. Jacques E. C. Hymans. "Theories of Nuclear Proliferation: The State of the Field," abstract, The Nonproliferation Review 13 (2006): 455-465, accessed February 1, 2015, doi: 10.1080/10736700601071397, http://www.tandfonline.com/.
18. T. Greenwood, H.A. Feiveson, and T.B. Taylor, "Nuclear Proliferation: Motivations, Capabilities, and Strategies for Control."
19. Graham T. Allison. "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," abstract, American Political Science Review 63 (1969): 689-718, accessed February 1, 2015, doi: 10.2307/1954423, http://journals.cambridge.org/.
potential more as a state deterrent weapon than an actual weapon.
Thus, nuclear weaponization has come to be a bargaining power, first for superpowers, and later for recent joiners of nuclear club. That is, nuclear proliferation becomes a means of influence re-distribution and lesser probability for conflict and war from an optimistic, pro-proliferation view and greater risks of accident, anger and, ultimately war, from a pessimist anti-proliferation view. 20
The collapse of USSR has not, in fact, introduced major changes in nuclear weaponization. Indeed, world's sole superpower and emerging economic powers continued to act according to Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 21 Interestingly, in a multipolar world, NPT remains a multilateral agreement which does not embrace more flexible models of state and non-state response. Propositions are made to address gaps in multilateral arrangements by emphasizing bilateral and exclusion as viable options for action under a nuclear proliferation regime. 22 States, according to a multimodal model proposal of nuclear proliferation, are encouraged or warned based on compliance cost of joining NPT. That is, whereas lesser compliance cost states can be persuaded into non-proliferation based on NPT alone, higher compliance cost states are punished for non-proliferation. 23
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20. Erik Gartzke and Dong-Joon Jo. "Bargaining, Nuclear Proliferation, and Interstate Disputes."
21. "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)," United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, accessed February 1, 2015, http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT.shtml.
22. Daniel Verdier. "Multilateralism, Bilateralism, and Exclusion in the Nuclear Proliferation Regime," abstract, International Organization 62 (2008): 439-476, accessed February 1, 2015, doi: 10.1017/S0020818308080156, http://journals.cambridge.org/.

Still, in a post-Cold War era dynamics of proliferation remains unclear. 24

The unfolding world situation makes nuclear weaponization an increasingly complicated and unclear issue. Although major non-proliferation claims – e.g. rogue states, lack of outside security guarantees, falling technology barriers and availability to non-state actors 25 – still hold in a post-Cold War era, supply-and-demand approach to nuclear weaponization has come to occupy a central spot in debates against / for nuclear proliferation. 26
The case for proliferation has further been emphasized by a set of international political dynamics and phenomena including, changing security ecosystem, growing asymmetric nuclear capabilities, increased national
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23. Ibid.
24. Tanya Ogilvie-White."Is there a theory of nuclear proliferation? An analysis of the contemporary debate."
25. Sonali Singh and Christopher R. Way. "The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation: A Quantitative Test."
26. Jacques E. C. Hymans. "Theories of Nuclear Proliferation: The State of the Field."
27. Matthew Kroenig. "Importing the Bomb: Sensitive Nuclear Assistance and Nuclear Proliferation," abstract, Journal of Conflict Resolution (2009), accessed February 1, 2015, doi: 10.1177/0022002708330287, http://online.sagepub.com/.
28. Jacques E. C. Hymans. "THEORIES OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: The State of the Field."
security risk from state and non-state actors and intensified risks posed to pariah states in a post- Cold War world. The question for nuclear weaponization has, accordingly, become one, not of prevention or containment, but of management. 29
Therefore, against rising risks from rogue states such as North Korea and Iran, concerns rise for a possible nuclear weaponization race in Middle East and Northeast Asia. 30 Rogue states become proliferators of nuclear weaponization not only as a natural propensity expressed by nuclear weapon producers 31 but also as means to counter influences exercised by regional and global powers.
Admittedly, instead of incentivizing or punishing non-signatories according to international law, new frameworks of nuclear weaponization need to be crafted and
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29. Peter D. Feaver and Emerson M. S. Niou. "Managing Nuclear Proliferation: Condemn, Strike, or Assist?"
30. Peter R. Lavoy. "Nuclear Proliferation over the Next Decade: Causes, Warning Signs, and Policy Responses."
31. Matthew Kroenig. "Importing the Bomb: Sensitive Nuclear Assistance and Nuclear Proliferation."
32. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William H. Riker. "An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Nuclear Proliferation."
adopted in light of new global nuclear order. 33 The current adopted non-proliferation regime seems to fail to respond successfully to growing concerns and emerging risks in an international political scene in which uncertainty dominates state-state relationships, let alone relationships between state and non-state actors. The current international legal climate – as well as existing inter-state organizations such as UN – is subject, moreover, to increasing criticism and pressure both attributed to a radically different international, political, economic and legal climate in a post-Cold War world.
The increased national security risk from state and non-state actors is another case in point for additional concern about exiting non-proliferation regime. Contrary to a Cold War world, interstate nuclear rivalry (e.g. India – Pakistan) has further complicated nuclear war potential from one possible by superpowers on a global platform – and mitigated into regional wars waged by proxy – into one possible by regional powers on a regional platform with implications on a global platform.
Terrorism is, for one, an additional reason for concern about nuclear weaponization. By USSR collapse, an international black market of nuclear weapons has emerged, further spreading risks of nuclear proliferation, outside of state control. By offering nuclear weapons in an international market, rogue states could now bargain and bully competing states and world powers over specific demands or simply expand influence clout. Given current NPT, non-state actors are poorly addressed. The scale and depth of damage which might be caused by local and
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33. Steven E. Miller and Scott D. Sagan. "Nuclear power without nuclear proliferation?"
cross-border terrorist groups cannot be overemphasized. Given recent shift in terrorist operations from ones largely based abroad and for limited number of causes, spreading network groups and evolving models for cross-border terrorism, potentials of nuclear risks soar as independent, non-ideologized, mercenary groups offer services for financial returns. Therefore, in lieu of state-sponsored terrorism, which was a dominant form of terrorism earlier, existing and potential forms call for immediate international response, particularly in nuclear weaponization area which is not a adequately addressed for existing non-state, network actors.
Notably, as well, risks are intensified for pariah states in a post-Cold War world. 34 If states like Israel, Taiwan and South Africa resort to nuclear weaponization as a means of power equalizers against perceived or potential risks in a Cold War era, nuclear option adoption becomes a more viable one given growing national security risks from both state and non-state actors. The case for Israel is particularly interesting. Situated within a "hostile" milieu since foundation, Israel is a state whose pariah status is uniquely of strategic significance. Beset by hostile neighboring, assuming not only a conventional strategic dilemma of surpassing neighbors in military superiority but also to assume nuclear weaponization as an integral part of her own military values. The heightened and prolonged Israeli-Arab conflict during 1948 (foundation year), mid-1950's, 1967 and 1973 was a heyday of guaranteed outside support from nuclear powers such as U.S. By end of large-scale conflicts, however, particularly after Israel's Camp David Peace Accord with Egypt, Israel's nuclear program weaponization has become less and less justified. Indeed, as
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34. Robert E. Harkavy. "Pariah states and nuclear proliferation."
surrounding neighbors called for an end to Israel's nuclear program, increasing pressure has been exercised on a country whose eroding, blank- check support has receded over years for overlapping, complex reasons in a very dynamic international scene in a post-Cold War world.
In conclusion, major approaches to nuclear (non)proliferation has been discussed. As a non-proliferation approach from a realistic, state controlled point of view has continued to dominate debates about nuclear weaponization, emerging new realities in world politics in a post-Cold War world has questioned basic assumptions laid out within a non-proliferation framework. The rise of new nuclear powers, emergence of non-state players as influencers of world politics, shifting alliances and increasing fluidity in world politics dynamics and mechanisms further emphasize a management – vis-à-vis control – approach to nuclear weaponization in a multipolar world. By reconsidering approaches to nuclear weaponization, international law's seminal agreement of NPT needs not only be extended by reviewed in light of completely new realities and shifting paradigms. Indeed, given existing NPT's failure to address major nuclear disputes, fresh bilateral as well as multilateral agreements should be made in order to fill in gaps and respond more flexibly to a supply-and-demand market of nuclear weaponry.

Bibliography

Allison, T. Graham. "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," abstract, American Political Science Review 63 (1969): 689-718. Accessed February 1, 2015, doi: 10.2307/1954423.
Brito , L. Dagobert, and Intriligator, D. Michael "Chapter 6 Arms races and proliferation," abstract, Handbook of Defense Economics 1 (1995):  109–164. Accessed February 1, 2015, doi: 10.1016/S1574-0013(05)80008-0.
Campbell, M. Kurt. "Nuclear proliferation beyond rogues," abstract, The Washington Quarterly 26 (2002): 5-15. Accessed February 1, 2015, doi: 10.1162/016366003761036453.
de Mesquita, Bueno Bruce, and Riker , H. William. "An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Nuclear Proliferation," abstract, Journal of Conflict Resolution 26 (1982): 283-306. Accessed February 1, 2015, doi:10.1177/0022002782026002005.
Feaver, D. Peter, and Niou, M. S. Emerson. "Managing Nuclear Proliferation: Condemn, Strike, or Assist?" abstract, International Studies Quarterly 40 (1996): 209-233. Accessed February 1, 2015, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600957.
Gartzke, Erik and Jo, Dong-Joon . "Bargaining, Nuclear Proliferation, and Interstate Disputes," abstract, Journal of Conflict Resolution 53 (2009): 209-233. Accessed February 1, 2015, doi: 10.1177/0022002708330289.
Greenwood, T., Feiveson, H.A., and Taylor, B. T., "Nuclear Proliferation: Motivations, Capabilities, and Strategies for Control," synopsis of Nuclear Proliferation: Motivations, Capabilities, and Strategies for Control (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1977). Accessed February 1, 2015, doi: 7286490.
Harkavy, E. Robert. "Pariah states and nuclear proliferation," abstract, International Organization 35 (1981): 135-163. Accessed February 1, 2015, doi: 10.1017/S0020818300004112.
Hymans, E. C. Jacques. "THEORIES OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: The State of the Field," abstract, The Nonproliferation Review 13 (2006): 455-465. Accessed February 1, 2015, doi: 10.1080/10736700601071397.
Intriligator, D. Michael, and Brito, L. Dagobert. "Nuclear proliferation and the probability of nuclear war," abstract, Public Choice 37 (1981): 247-260. Accessed February 1, 2015, doi: 10.1007/BF00138245.
Lavoy , R. Peter. "Nuclear Proliferation over the Next Decade: Causes, Warning Signs, and Policy Responses," abstract, The Nonproliferation Review 13 (2006): 433-454. Accessed February 1, 2015, doi: 10.1080/10736700601071363.
Matthew Kroenig. "Importing the Bomb: Sensitive Nuclear Assistance and Nuclear Proliferation," abstract, Journal of Conflict Resolution (2009). Accessed February 1, 2015, doi: 10.1177/0022002708330287.
Miller, E. Steven, and Sagan, D. Scott. "Nuclear power without nuclear proliferation?" abstract, Daedalus 138 (2009): 7-18. Accessed February 1, 2015, doi: 10.1162/daed.2009.138.4.7.
Ogilvie-White, Tanya."Is there a theory of nuclear proliferation? An analysis of the contemporary debate," abstract, The Nonproliferation Review 4 (1996): 43-60. Accessed February 1, 2015, doi: 10.1080/10736709608436652.
Ollapally, Deepa, and Ramanna, Raja. "U.S.-India Tensions: Misperceptions on Nuclear Proliferation," excerpt, Foreign Affairs 13 (1995). Accessed February 1, 2015, http://www.heinonline.org/HOL/CSV.csv?index=journals&collection=journals.
Rosen, Peter Stephen. "After Proliferation: What to Do If More States Go Nuclear," abstract, Foreign Affairs 85 (2006): 9-14. Accessed February 1, 2015, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20032066.
Schneider, R. Barry. "Nuclear Proliferation and Counter-Proliferation: Policy Issues and Debates," abstract, Mershon International Studies Review 38 (1994): 209-234. Accessed February 1, 2015, http://www.jstor.org/stable/222715.
Singh, Sonali, and Way, R. Christopher. "The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation: A Quantitative Test," abstract, Journal of Conflict Resolution 48 (2004): 859-885. Accessed February 1, 2015, doi: 10.1177/0022002704269655.
"Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)," United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. Accessed February 1, 2015, http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT.shtml.
Verdier, Daniel. "Multilateralism, Bilateralism, and Exclusion in the Nuclear Proliferation Regime," abstract, International Organization 62 (2008): 439-476. Accessed February 1, 2015, doi: 10.1017/S0020818308080156.